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This article aims to constructively reconsider the accepted relations of the language of 
alterity and hospitality, traditionally drawn from Levinas and Derrida, which have 
been assumed to be applicable to xenophobia. A closer assessment of Levinas reveals 
that his ‘structure’ fails to apply to recent sorts of xenophobic incidents. Just so, 
Derrida's work upon hospitality does not apply, which Derrida was aware of. Indeed, 
nor will Levinas and Derrida be disagreed with; a shadow-phenomenology will rather 
emerge which allows for more sympathetic and applicable treatment of some 
‘xenophobic’ incidents – in South Africa and globally.  
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Following the increasing frequency of cross-border issues, migration, and xenophobic 
attacks, work upon xenophobia has become a growing theme in critical study and fiction. We 
will explain how theories of alterity and hospitality, drawn from Levinas and Derrida, were 
never applicable to such concerns. To situate the discussion in a sequence: the source of 
otherness in literary studies is often located in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity (1961), in which 
the other is treated as radically other to a self. In turn, ‘the other’ is treated as interchangeable 
with the different, the strange and ‘the stranger’,1 thereby extending the framework to 
xenophobia (fear of the stranger).2 The stranger in turn is equated with the ‘foreigner’. In 
several cases, fear of foreigners is treated as a fear of ‘apocalypse’ – death of a subject or 
those it values.3 To redress such concerns, literary study often assesses xenophobia in terms 
of a requirement for ‘responsibility’ to the other (after Levinas) and the paradoxes of 
‘hospitality’,4 mostly developed from Derrida’s application of Levinas.5 But perhaps each 
step of that sequence warrants some attention. We consider alterity in Levinas, contrast it to 
xenophobia as fear of apocalypse, then to Derrida’s ‘hospitality’ to explain that their work 
was never applicable to xenophobia (and nor did they wish it to be), and also that such 
application is deeply unfair to the xenophobic. Such demonstration might be a little 
unnerving, as the language of alterity and difference has for decades been taken as basal to 
theory, so a bulwark of literary and cultural studies.6 Nor will that support be undone but, we 
hope, rather clarified and resituated. Our demonstration will adumbrate a shadow-
phenomenology of one sort of xenophobia, stemming from lack, in order to further such 
studies in Africa and globally. 
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Levinas’ ethics 
We first assess Levinas’ Totalité et infini of 1961, to follow how he approaches alterity. 
Levinas applies four French terms for ‘other’: l’autre, l’Autre, autrui and Autrui (which we 
explained elsewhere are very little considered in Levinas study (Galetti, 2015)). All, as do the 
English ‘alterity’ and ‘other’, derive from the Latin ‘alter’ – which means an ‘other’, 
especially one of two (Chambers Dictionary). Levinas will bring that root to its breaking-
point.  
To start, autre can be helpfully understood by ‘other’ in English, in that both can 
signify any sort of other, human or thing, and both  accept a definite or indefinite article (le, 
un). Hence both allow for logic in language (predicating ‘a’ of something), to predicate 
characteristics, and for pluralisation of an individual or genus (others, les autres). Thus 
‘other’ can be an epithet, while ‘alterity’ applies the general attribute ‘other’ to specific 
individuals.  
I approach Levinas as Derrida did (1964: 445): via Husserl (Levinas indeed explained 
in later years that since 1961 he had practised a phenomenology, which ‘worked back’ 
through conditions – i.e. to origins (1998: 87)). Famously, Husserl since 1900 aligned to 
‘intentionality’ as ‘consciousness of something’, an act corresponding to objectification. That 
object is given to consciousness in evidence, so is visualised ‘in front’ of consciousness. 
Husserl makes that directional intentionality correspond to the sense (Sinn) of logical 
predication, in which something is predicated of the subject according to the form ‘S is P’. 
From that form, Husserl derived the forms ‘S can be P’, ‘S must be P’, and ‘S is not P’, which 
express possibility, necessity and negation respectively (2002).  
Strikingly, Levinas concedes consciousness but finds an ‘intentionality’ that precedes 
Husserl’s, so long as language is already given to experience (which condition he will ‘work 
back’ to (infra)) (1961: 45 l.17).7 He employs signs – his preferred term for ‘words’ – that 
refuse distance and sight, so precede objectification (82 l.19). Before ‘consciousness of 
something’ one ‘lives from…’ in ‘enjoyment’ (82 l.33). Indeed, before even a sense of 
‘other’, one still lives as a ‘we’.8 We ‘live from…’ (Nous vivons de); from good soup, from 
bread, work, at home with ourselves (82 l.17).  
Levinas’ ‘living from’ will require no Husserlian correspondence to a formal logic 
outside it, yet allows form. Indeed, Levinas allows a structure: 
[O]ur analyses are guided by a formal structure, the idea of infinity in us.  
           (52) 
To that end, Levinas only then allows sight and distance, to move from a ‘we’ – as 
ipseity follows when I am ‘in view of myself’.  
Still, that is merely an ‘optics’, not yet ‘ethics’. Levinas moves past ‘this other’ (cet 
autre), which individuation sets a thing and human in parity; I am never a thing to myself. 
Rather, I am first an ego, hence an other being (un autre être) to myself (31 l.25). That 
requires as its condition the Me (Moi). The adjective ‘other’ can enter in language, and even 
the ‘bread I eat’ becomes other. 
In turn, consciousness before something precludes scanning a range ‘from left to 
right’, so from ‘one to the other’ (5 l.33). Leaping to the Me can only occur without external 
viewpoint upon the other. Hence in enjoyment ‘I can’ seek (for Levinas, ‘I can’ thus signifies 
a practical ability in being, before logical predication of possibility and necessity, and before 
predicating of something). Thus, in consciousness, a desire drives me toward ‘a wholly other 
thing’ (3 l.18). That whole would first be the essence of ‘other’: which Levinas effects a 
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transcendence to l’Autre (‘the Other’). Thus, Levinas emphasizes, the Other is not other like 
the bread I eat (3 l.12). He adapts (Hegelian to Husserlian) logic. Keeping negation allows an 
opposite, so a difference before objectivity. Intentionality seeks identification, thus I am not 
like myself, which looks at me from outside, but first require the other to be the same (le 
même) (257). As ‘this other’ would individuate it as what it is, so make it not the same as me 
(90); desire for the Other allows identification to rise to the Same (upper-case, to signify that 
it is essential, an idea) – the Same is ‘essentially identification’ (10).  
Yet desire for the Other finds also that the Other is other to it, so other to me. Before 
objectification and ‘opposition’ (6 l. 36), ‘the I’ (le je) ‘takes itself as other’ without 
distinction (supra), so the I is not an Other (7 l.2, 6, 11). Such ‘freedom’ allows an other to 
be no longer different from me in essence. However, neutralising the Other as such would 
‘reduce’ it to the Same, so to an identity (14 l.7). The Other can be an essence for me only 
insofar as its essence is to dwell at the ‘point of departure’ from an intending of essence (12 l. 
13). Its alterity could only be constituted as a ‘radical’ heterogeneity (a difference before 
genus), for by its essence it must avoid essential difference and opposition. The essence of 
the Other is to be Other to the Same. Yet the Other has been afforded ‘relation’ to the Same 
in a fashion that evolves the conjunction (et), which signifies addition only insofar as one 
conjunct essentially eludes. The sign ‘and’ (et) indicates, yet never has ‘power’ (pouvoir, 
which in French means both power and possibility, the essence of possible ability) over, the 
other: 
We are the Same and the Other. The conjunction and indicates here 
neither addition, nor power [pouvoir] of one term over the other [l’autre]. 
      (9 l.20)  
Still, that conjunction never frees the Other, so nor could the Other wholly exceed the 
Same. That implies finitude of the Other ‘within the transcendence’ of ‘Desire’.  
Yet an idea of a beyond to the Other still ‘has a sense’ (sens) – Sinn, which in French also 
signifies ‘direction’ (4 l.38). That ‘idea’ no longer even allows the ‘and’ – going beyond ‘the 
Same and the [finite] Other’ requires the idea of infinity (xv l.14). 
 
 
 
Bodily other 
Levinas revisits ‘living from…’ (101 l.1). As ‘the other’ can mean a thing or person, in 
enjoyment as being it is first things that are ‘other’, before even an ‘I’ (supra). In that 
mundane sense, ‘things’ are first ‘possessions’, they are furniture as moveables (meubles), 
which sense is ‘elemental’ (104 l.11). Such elements suffice, ‘before the distinction between 
finite and infinite’, so before the idea of the infinite (105 l.25). Still, possession allows only 
‘indefinite’ being, the apeiron (132 l.22), and is aligned with its ‘Heideggerian sense’ of 
using tools – which Levinas rejects. Essentially, such things merely present ‘the “other’ 
aspect’ (face) (105 l.33) rather than the face (113 l.19).  
Levinas considers ‘how’ to go to freedom beyond the Same. Before essence, ‘being 
me’ implies ‘the other’, as body – ‘I exist as body’. Hence ‘this other’ as individual is 
converted to the ‘same’ by working (travaillant), which takes the body as its possession (90 
l.2). Even so, possession could never de-prioritise the body (which Heidegger’s ordinal 
priority of the question of ‘Being’ over an existent ‘being’ does) for the body ‘interests’ me – 
from interresse as different, as ‘going between’ (131). A sense of ‘me’ as body follows, so 
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desire for the other as my body. Still, desire is produced in work (travail), possession of a 
thing, finitude (141 l.5); it turns out that working no longer suffices.  
So Levinas in  1961 never accords ‘the other’ a face, ‘l’autre lacks visage, yet the 
Other, separate without opposition from the Same – so without priority that could subordinate 
the Other – can present its face (visage) to me; yet that too is essentially terrestrial (177 l). I 
am offered only a face which indicates that essential withholding from sense. Levinas 
develops language, for as metaphor the face indicates an anteriority to the givenness of sense 
(Sinngebung) (xv l.12). Levinas’ intentionality also lets him treat the face as comprehension 
by sight, as Husserl’s did, yet vision follows enjoyment (xvi l.16). To reach the infinite 
anterior to that face, desire begins to overflow the transcendence to the Other.  
 
 
autrui 
To that end, autrui means ‘others’ but excludes others as worldly things. In language, it 
refuses a definite article, so signifies a plural signified never wholly present in its signifier. 
That signified may be empirical or not – the form of autrui ‘opens’ the relation, to avoid 
reducing it to the Same. In turn, autrui refuses a definite or indefinite article, so resists 
declension. It thus precludes application as an epithet, which would be predicating (Derrida, 
1964: 350). Thus nor does its sense allow consciousness of ‘something’, nor a correlative 
object or corresponding thing, nor indefinite being as apeiron, nor specific content that rises 
to its genus, especially not ‘this man’ that could rise to the genus of Man.  
Yet, for Levinas, the face certainly has a sense as a part of a human body. Following 
his intentionality, in enjoyment at home with myself in dwelling,  
I welcome autrui that presents itself in my house, in opening my home to 
him/her/it [lui].   
(146) 
Just as the Sinngebung in the face of autrui arises as a rupture in enjoyment, before it 
can pertain to ‘an other’, to ‘the other’ as wholly other thing, or rise to the Same and the 
Other, crucially, a moment of welcome in my home arises for autrui (175 l.20).  
Yet the face is ‘not knowledge of an object’ (supra), so nor are the logic and ontology 
of the Same dismissed – they merely fail to ground the sense of autrui, implying a lack of 
being, but also an inability of predicating and simple hierarchy. So while ‘simple opposition’ 
was surpassed with the Same and the Other (supra) (23 l.34), the face no longer leaves a 
‘logical place’ for its ‘contradictory’ (175 l.20). Yet, following enjoyment, Levinas can work 
back in language. First, autrui in informal speech also means a singular human ‘you’ (tu), 
which bypasses the senses of the signifier as closer to consciousness and distance to a 
signified. One employs language to speak to autrui which is indeclinable in language; it is 
autrui that one addresses in a proximity as ‘intimacy’ (intimité, which means both privacy 
and intimacy, ‘alone’ or ‘together’). Yet nor could autrui be a simple ‘personal other’, an 
impetus to avoid conventions that unwarily fix a characteristic or predicate to ‘other’ – as if I 
know autrui is a person as I am. Rather, it has followed, autrui means (signifie) this human 
(or person, or man) only insofar as it refuses the category of humanity that I could treat as its 
finite attribute, only insofar as it is the absolute stranger infinitely far from me. Thus autrui 
keeps its freedom. Importantly, Levinas summarizes, autrui signifies  
the man who can be absolutely stranger to me – refractory to all typology, 
all genre, all characterology, all classification – […] the strangeness of 
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autrui, its very freedom!       
       (46 l.8) 
One arrives at Levinas’ autrui as condition for a stranger in its strangeness. For 
Levinas, autrui as (absolute) stranger is stranger even than the radical difference of the Other 
(supra) that permits its freedom. 
Indeed, it has followed, the rupture by autrui is a condition for thought of alterity in 
being as enjoyment and for the other in work. Thus autrui takes the bread from my mouth 
(which the Other left undisturbed), leaving ‘hunger’ as a bodily ‘need’ (48). 
 
Autrui to the other 
In turn, autrui’s ‘height’ implies the ‘Most-High’ as Autrui, which sign resists logic and 
language as autrui does. Just so, as per the Other and autrui, I can see Autrui in the face that 
ruptures enjoyment (supra). Moreover, autrui has the sense in formal speech of politeness, 
‘you’ as vous – so capitalisation into Autrui accepts a religious connotation, as proximity to a 
distant ‘Thou’ to whom one speaks in intimacy and also with reverence. 
Moreover, as ‘most-High’, Autrui is a condition for the given even before Sinngebung 
(supra). As the given refers to the giver, Autrui gives (64), so ‘reason’ is reformulated as our 
capacity to receive. As autrui is the condition for thought of alterity (supra), I can think I am 
given what I need. Thus I recognise I am hungry and can be sated. Were that sufficient, of 
course, I could satisfy my hunger to ‘assimilate’ even the other, by working from this other to 
the same (v. 89-90). Yet Autrui gives without primacy of thought, no longer recognising a 
bodily need, so without satiety, even though without lack; moreover, desire still seeks to go 
to Autrui with what I am given. Thus Desire seeks to give. Such ‘analysis’ is still essential, 
thus cognition of an essential difference in the effects upon me of autrui and Autrui; ‘[t]he 
difference between need and Desire’ means that:  
[t]o recognise autrui, it is to recognise a hunger. To recognise Autrui – it 
is to give.        
         (48)  
That allows Autrui too its refusal of essential categories, to transcend the Same by an 
even ‘higher dimension’ to the absolute Other (as Stranger, in the upper case, as essential) – 
that Stranger further precedes even the original root of ‘alter’ as ‘one of two’. Levinas 
summarizes: 
The absolutely Other is Autrui. He and I do not form a number. The 
collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not a plural of the ‘I’. … [The] 
Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself […] also means the 
free one […] He escapes my grasp by an essential dimension…  
         (9)  
Hence autrui (thus Autrui) is the ‘original event’ of signification (64 l.34). As Levinas 
only let sight follow enjoyment, Autrui begins to be understood in hearing; the face speaks 
(37). That ‘height’ from which speech comes is understood by ‘teaching’ (9) –  Desire 
‘understands and hears’ (entend) Autrui in speech (146), which too refuses visibility or 
distance, a teaching in intimacy (90, 128 l.39). It follows that ‘thought’ consists of speaking. 
Importantly, the prior sequence, from enjoyment to Autrui, is ‘elevated’ to the higher 
dimension of language, in ‘discourse’ (Ibid). 
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A next stage follows, in a sort of ruptured circularity (a term Levinas strictly avoids as 
it would evoke only the same), as we rise to ethical intentionality. Discourse is elevated to the 
‘heights’ from which the ‘I can’ proceeds once more in language, so as ‘responsibility’ 
(réponse/abilité), and revisits the other beyond Autrui. Hence, it follows, language no longer 
reaches the other (l’autre), no longer ‘even tangentially’, even as a ‘silent language’ in 
intimacy. A turning toward an ‘elsewhere’ occurs according to interiority, and the other only 
be reached by a being without need, which in a certain sense lacks nothing (32 l.29), as the 
other comes from exteriority beyond the logos, the essential origin of language. That 
‘structure’ – asymmetry as ‘metaphysics’ – is the idea of infinity which Levinas’ sequence 
has worked back to. ‘The other metaphysically desired’ in its absolute difference – ethical 
lack of separation as absolute separation – can only be reached in its sense (sens, direction) 
by a being in righteous straightforwardness (droiture) (33 l.35). One revisits ‘the other in an 
eminent sense’, in ethics (3 l.1). One finds much more in Levinas, but for our purposes we 
halt here. 
 
 
Xenophobia before Levinas 
We employ an African example to elucidate one style of xenophobia. Consider the 
xenophobic attacks in South Africa, which first occurred against migrants in Alexandra 
township in March 2008 and erupted again in more locales in January 2015.9 A 
phenomenology arises that shadows Levinas’ at each juncture. It too begins from 
intentionality, provided that there is language to ‘work back’ to conditions. Consciousness 
too begins from a ‘we’ who live. However, intentionality avoids Husserl’s sort, in a way that 
begins to precede Levinas’. Consciousness is not yet of something given, as an object, but 
something lacking before it is an object. Thus our pre-objective intentionality does not yet 
begin from Levinas’ ‘enjoyment’. To be sure, ours is a ‘dwelling’… but we fail to enjoy when 
there is not enough good soup, not enough bread, when we are hungry for them. We live in 
lack of enjoyment. The ‘sense’ of soup and bread are rather that of threat – they can be 
removed.  
Nevertheless, I can be in view of myself, in ipseity, and my body can be other to me. 
The bread I eat too can become other. Hence I can still desire the other (autre), as one of two, 
who is the same as me. Moreover, certainly, I experience the stranger, and thus I see the 
stranger appears. Yet in lack I am unable to experience the stranger as other, insofar as I 
experience myself as not one of two (alter) with the stranger; the stranger is not an other 
which can become the same as me, nor even be like me, which would require me to see it as 
other. I am unable to identify it as other, and experience it as strange from the first.  
Its sense is thus not yet logical, I predicate no characteristics of it – rather, in lack of 
enjoyment, the logical necessity of intentionality becomes a need. However, before I consider 
my power to affect things, I fear I am not able to fulfil my need. Negation applies before its 
logical and empowering uses. As we live in lack, in need, I do not desire the other; and 
henceforth ‘the other’ is not identifiable with the stranger, for our experience of the stranger 
is that of fear. We fear it comes to take our soup.  That fear does not become desire for a 
wholly other thing – fear of the stranger does not transcend enjoyment to essence, so is also 
not included to the Same. Thus no other in its individual sense, nor Other pertain to the 
stranger. We are not the Same and the Other. That stranger thus eludes the structure of 
‘alterity’, the predicate of otherness. Instead of alterity, it has a sense of xenoity, a Greek sign 
that originates before even a common root in ‘alter’. In turn, I have no sense of its finitude, 
which I require for a sense of the infinite. The xenoity of the stranger does not appear to me 
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by the ‘idea of infinity’. We fear we are ‘powerless’. So in lack of enjoyment, that threat by 
the stranger is before the subject and prior to the I, and as we fear it comes to take our bread, 
it has the sense of threat to ‘us’. Xenophobia – the ‘fear’ of ‘the stranger’ (xenos) – is never 
solely about myself, but fear for we who live in lack, who fear the threat to that which we live 
from. Thus the experience of the stranger that appears as a threat to us can still be expressed 
in language – the language, to be sure, of theory – as fear of apocalypse (from apokaluptein, 
‘uncover’). It appears as a threat to our being, a threat of our non-being, a threat of death. 
So, to revisit Levinas’ other in being, and lack of ‘living from’ – it is indeed first 
things that are other. However, we lack enough things, we experience a lack, a lack of 
possessions, of furniture. Possessions are not elemental, our lack is elemental, so our fear of 
apocalypse is prior to what we possess. I possess my body, but too little else, too little 
furniture, and insufficient work. The stranger threatens that which I possess – my body that 
works – as well as that which I lack. Hence my lack of possessions is unrelated to indefinite 
being, for insofar as I lack possessions I have no tools. Such things reveal their aspects to me 
but, without the other or the Other, do not reveal the face of the stranger.  
The stranger of xenophobia is faceless to us. So though I exist as body, my working 
does not convert the other to the same. Rather, I fear that stranger comes to take work from 
the body that I possess. I thus have no ‘interest’ in the faceless stranger, so do not 
comprehend it in my sight. Even were it to have facial expressions – such as a plea, or 
suffering – I could not see it. I do not welcome the stranger into our dwelling. Rather, I fear 
the stranger before it can become a man, of the genus Man, and before it is a man like me. 
Long before it can reveal its face, a condition for hospitality, the stranger is unwelcome.  
Of course, nor am I unwelcoming to all. I can comprehend others (autrui), and 
welcome them as single or together. However, I cannot include the stranger to language. 
Crucially, the stranger that I fear does not speak my language. Hence no rupture of my lack 
of enjoyment occurs by the face of autrui. The fear of the faceless stranger is prior even to 
responsibility for autrui. Although in alterity the face overflows logic, the fear of the stranger 
and of apocalypse precedes logic. It is illogical. Language does not even fail to express what 
is before signification; my fear is inchoate and formless. Without language, I am unable to 
speak to the stranger in any informal way, I do not call it ‘you’. It is kept far from my 
intimacy, has no place in my privacy, when I am alone or together with an other or others 
(autrui). Yet the stranger is too close to me, its proximity is that of threat. So while Levinas’ 
autrui is the absolute stranger far from me, the proximity of our stranger engenders fear that 
it will destroy us. Before autrui has its freedom, I need grant to the stranger no freedom. 
Indeed, Levinas’ stranger only then takes the bread from my mouth, leaving bodily 
need. We lacked, and my body needed, from the first. Thus even Autrui has no relation to our 
stranger – it does not imply reverence; I treat the stranger irreverently. I keep it from my 
religion – I can be religious to others (l’autre, l’Autre, autrui, Autrui), but our experience of 
the stranger is irreligious. Just so, as I recognize no stranger, the Stranger that does not speak 
my language, does not give, but threatens to take. Hence I am ‘unreasonable’ insofar as I do 
not receive, and I am ungenerous. I seek to withhold – to keep the stranger from my bread, 
which belongs to us, to me as other and to others who are the same as me; I seek to keep the 
stranger from working. The ‘our’ and ‘we’ of Levinas’ collective is after the ‘we’ who lack 
and fear, the stranger is long before becoming a number to us, but a singular threat. Thus we 
allow no Stranger, for the stranger lacks an essential dimension from the first. Its difference 
from me is before essential difference, and before the absolute difference and asymmetry of a 
structure of separation and connection. The stranger does not teach me, I learn nothing from 
it. Before all, we do not ‘lack nothing’ – we lack before anything. Hence we also fail to 
metaphysically desire the stranger as ‘the other in an eminent sense’ that comes from 
exteriority. We do not think of or speak to the stranger but act, in our fear and need, to keep it 
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from our work and bread. That stranger – the migrant – comes from beyond elsewhere, even 
further beyond than exteriority, beyond borders. So, without all four terms, the stranger of the 
xenophobic eludes the structure of alterity. We lack a responsibility to welcome that which 
we fear will destroy us, and grant it no freedom to live in our dwelling. But only from the 
height of ethics could we be deemed unethical. 
 
Derrida’s hospitality 
How, thus, could welcome occur? In Adieu (1999), Derrida starts from Levinas’ ‘structure’ as 
developed above, quoting one paragraph from Totalité et infini on three occasions: 
To approach the Other [Autrui] in discourse is to welcome his expression, 
in which at each instance he overflows the idea a thought would carry 
away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other [Autrui] beyond the 
capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of Infinity. But 
this also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Discourse, is 
… An ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this discourse is a 
teaching. … It comes, and comes from elsewhere, from the exterior, from 
the other [l’autre].   (18, 25, 27; Levinas 1961: 22 ff;  
Derrida’s emphases) 
Hence we address Derrida insofar as his approach conforms to Levinas, in these 
works. First, the subject – thus the I – is a ‘host’ in the dwelling, and Derrida emphasizes the 
importance of the idea of Infinity to welcome Autrui, which grants Autrui its freedom (60, 
quoting Levinas 1961: 66). The ‘structure’ of welcome developed from intentionality 
follows:  
this approach of the face – as intentionality or welcome, that is, as 
hospitality – remains inseparable from separation itself. Hospitality 
assumes ‘radical separation’ as experience of the alterity of the other 
[l’autre], as relation to the other.      
        (46) 
We hope it is obvious that Levinas’ structure (supra) conforms to that which Derrida 
calls ‘hospitality’. Indeed, Derrida summarizes, ‘intentionality is hospitality’, and ‘one would 
understand nothing about hospitality without clarifying it through phenomenology of 
intentionality’ (51, our emphasis).  
We tried to do so. Then we detailed how, in phenomenology of intentionality as lack, 
before Autrui and the other, we do not welcome the stranger, are not a host and do not desire 
to be hospitable.  
From this juncture, Derrida develops hospitality via Levinas’ later Autrement 
qu’être.10 Most Derridean work centres here – valuably – on the etymology of hospitality.11  
The Latin root of ‘host’ is also the root of ‘guest’, and hostage; in discourse, the host is also 
originarily and can become the hostage of the guest, thus ‘in proximity to the hostility of the 
hostis’ (57, also 2002: 359-363).  
The dilemmas of the host that seeks to welcome the other, and ends up hostile, follow. 
Thus a slide begins to occur in literary and cultural study, in that ‘hostility’ comes to be 
equated to xenophobia. As Rosello puts it:  
When strangers meet strangers, each becomes not only both a potential 
host and a potential guest, but also … A potential enemy: the old Latin 
equivalent between the host and the enemy continues to lurk behind each 
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generous attempt at meeting the other on his or her ground, and suspicion 
may, at any time, poison the budding relationship between … National 
and immigrant’ (2001:75).   
But xenophobia has no root in hostis. To assess its applicability, one would require at 
least to relate hostility to ‘the stranger’ – that relation is not considered in Adieu, but in Of 
Hospitality; and may be less applicable to Levinas and xenophobia than has been assumed. 
At issue is still whether the Stranger enters hospitality via alterity. 
 
 
Of Hospitality 
Indeed, in Of Hospitality Derrida does link the other (l’autre) to the stranger (l’étranger), 
rendered by the translator as ‘foreigner’ (ix). Derrida considers also the root xenos (in Greek 
‘both stranger and foreigner’). In Plato’s Sophist, the Stranger goes up against Socrates vis-á-
vis the ‘accepted logos’ of Parmenides, that being is and nonbeing is not. Derrida sets up the 
stakes by reference to Levinas’ economy (from oikos, the home/hearth) and an essential 
Stranger. It is 
as though the Foreigner [Xenos] had to begin by contesting … the ‘master 
of the house’ [by contesting] the power of hospitality.   
        (5) 
However, Derrida is aware of what Levinas in 1961 never considered (supra) – a 
divergence in language, also allowing for threat. This Foreigner ‘speaks oddly’ (Ibid), so 
initiates ‘war’ in discourse about the ‘threatening logos’ of Parmenides. Indeed, this Stranger 
engages in ‘combat’ about ‘man as a political being’ (13).  
Next, Derrida does not mention Levinas’ ‘same’, but allows for a Stranger viewed as 
‘outside’, merely like Socrates (supra). Yet nor does Derrida find absolute strangeness, for 
Socrates – as he did at his trial by the Senate – acts ‘like’ a foreigner: 
[w]hat does [Socrates at his trial] say in presenting himself like a 
foreigner …?        
      (17, Derrida’s emphasis)  
Socrates, playing a verbal game, says: ‘I am a complete foreigner to the language of 
this place’. However, Derrida interprets the Greek to have ‘complete foreigner’ mean 
‘helpless’. According to Derrida: just as the Sophist speaks ‘oddly’, Socrates is complaining 
that ‘if I were foreign you would accept with more tolerance that I don’t speak as you do’ 
(21). Notice that Socrates accuses the Senate not of xenophobia, but xenophilia. Xenophobia 
has no role in the philosophical discussion.  
Secondly, Socrates, Sophist and Senate speak one language – the Stranger merely 
speaks ‘oddly’. He is not absolutely different. Derrida’s Sophist does not consider an absolute 
Foreigner, anarchically different and strange, who cannot speak our language (18). Thus 
Socrates can begin from a Foreigner like me, able to be emulated, as if one were like him, to 
question man as political being.  
Yet, thirdly, both the Sophist and Socrates want to speak. The Stranger in the Sophist 
does not come to destroy but to play verbal games in a mock war. Thereafter, the Sophist 
engages in debate about political being. For Derrida, the  
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contract of hospitality … links to the foreigner and… reciprocally links 
the foreigner.        
        (21) 
The stranger of xenophobia (supra) is unable to accept a contract, for it could not 
understand it and we would not comprehend it. That stranger is not yet like me, even if it does 
not enter as the same; does not link reciprocally for it is not yet welcome. Hence Derrida’s 
hospitality does not consider the foreigner as feared (phobia, rather than philia), nor which – 
before the logos – threatens an apocalypse. It does not consider we who are unable to engage, 
who do not want to speak to the faceless stranger, who fear our lives and work are threatened 
before words, are not yet ‘master of the house’ for we lack a house, and master too little, so 
who are not yet political because we have no political voice. In that fashion, the stranger and 
the xenophobic are more originary than hospitality, than Derrida’s phenomenology, so are 
occluded from his approach.  
Most strongly, application of alterity and hospitality by literary and cultural study is 
violent – it imposes those sorts of intentionalities onto these sorts of xenophobics who fear 
they are powerless. It argues that they ignore their responsibility because they do not try to be 
hospitable first, and assumes they are unethical. One marginalizes such xenophobics, is blind 
to the threat they feared from the start, since their lack of enjoyment. One ignores, for 
instance, S’bu Zikode (chairperson of the Durban-based Abahlali baseMjondolo [shack-
dwellers] Movement), who claims  
[t]hose in power are blind to our suffering. This is because they have not 
seen what we see; they have not felt what we are feeling every second, 
every day.        
   (Zikode 2006; in Flockeman: 249)   
To be sure, such xenophobics are only unethical – and they are – when they are 
actually inhospitable, and a fortiori when they are actually violent. But if Zikode is right, they 
are unethical only after their experiences have been marginalised. 
 
Derrida and xenophobia 
That oversight is soon demonstrated according to our priorities. Later in Of Hospitality, 
Derrida considers censorship in media (i.e. between those who share a language). That 
censorship – shutting websites, bugging phones – occurs by an unseen and ‘anonymous’ 
‘power’. Yet that power too is foreign, and at last, foreign to language. Indeed, it is without 
religion, as it is faceless and does not appear to the subject. As faceless, it sets aside every 
condition of hospitality (supra). Derrida points to his previous examples, and again situates 
the discussion via the ‘home’ and ‘traditional conditions of hospitality’ … to admit 
xenophobia (53). However, he thus derives the  
xenophobic circle (not directed to the foreigner as such, but, 
paradoxically against the anonymous technological power (foreign to the 
language or the religion, as much as to the family and the nation) which 
threatens, with the ‘home’ the traditional conditions of hospitality.  
      (53, our emphasis) 
In such a technological world, one can become ‘virtually xenophobic’ (53). Derrida 
separates his xenophobia of the foreigner from alterity, language and the face, and avoids the 
conditions for the home and hospitality. Yet his xenophobia and its threat, which follows 
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from Levinas, is merely virtual, and amongst we who have and enjoy possessions – 
cellphones, pc’s. As noted, we who lack do not have sufficient possessions; to be sure, we 
often have cellphones (an oddity of market penetration) even in Alexandra. However, we lack 
enough work, bread, and often even a ‘house’. Our faceless stranger is foreign to the nation, 
but what threatens us is that it is foreign to us in its proximity, for we have too little to give. 
That is an actual xenophobia, following a fear of apocalypse directed precisely at the 
stranger. Before all, that stranger has been overlooked. 
 
Conclusion 
Nonetheless, the above merely augments the genii! Levinas avoids the term 
‘apocalypse’; Derrida keeps apocalypse away from hospitality and xenophobia,12 and insists 
that his logic develops a duty to avoid xenophobia and acknowledge alterity, in favour of 
hospitality.13 Consideration of xenophobia is far from their generosity (even should it 
marginalise xenophobics). Indeed, they are also right. Doubtless, we are all the same or alike, 
all others – even migrants. Responsibility and hospitality are necessary for rational 
intentionality. But it is fear of apocalypse – however irrational – which originally and 
wordlessly drives such intentionality of xenophobia. Henceforth, nor ought a ‘tradition’ of 
alterity and hospitality to be applied to xenophobia incautiously; yet nor would previous – 
honourable – work in literary and cultural study be undone, but augmented. 
Indeed, many of the 2015 events in South Africa support these results. On January 23, the 
media, police and government described xenophobics who ransacked foreigner’s shops as 
criminals. But the lead photograph in The Star newspaper (23 January 2015) showed people 
running away with large soft-drinks and crates of tomatoes, which they lack; in the 
background, a foreigner, on her knees, is kept in place by two men. One is cradling a two-
litre soft-drink in his arm while his other arm pushes her down. They do not look at her face. 
In later weeks, academics and opposition parties stated that the root issues are poverty and 
unemployment, which the government at first denied, claiming the attacks were co-ordinated 
by criminals. Still, the government came under scrutiny from international governments, and 
on 28 April government leaders in South Africa claimed they ‘are not to blame’, stating that 
refugees left ‘citizens feeling cheated and out of jobs and resources’ (The Citizen)  
We followed that phenomenology. So, while some have claimed that phenomenology, 
including Levinas’ and Derrida’s, is practically and politically irrelevant,  that is not so. 
Contrasting xenophobia to alterity allows for clarifying the experiences at the root of such 
events, as a condition for political engagement. Of course, we have barely begun that task, 
and further alignments should occur judiciously (hence our references to literary and cultural 
studies occurred in footnotes, in a parallel structure). For instance, a fortiori, what would be 
the migrant’s experience – overlooked by theorists of hospitality, as well as the media and 
government parties! – which knows itself to be the stranger, yet is threatened by those who 
refuse to give?14 We have ways forward. We who speak to each other, however oddly, need 
to bridge languages, redress lack, restore enjoyment, see what the marginalized see and help 
them see what we do (that strangers are the same or alike). We could redress fear before we 
blame. In turn, we need to speak to others about xenophobe and stranger as political beings. 
We need to see again, before we can engage in politics. 
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1 For instance, Felski refers to ‘the recent impact of Levinas on literary studies. As an 
advocate of otherness, Levinas warns against the hubris of thinking that we can ultimately 
come to understand that which is different or strange. Ethics means accepting the 
mysteriousness of the other … For theorists weaned on the language of alterity and 
difference, ... to recognise is not just to trivialize but also to colonize’ (2008, 27). Let us be 
clear – we agree with Felski, but note the divergence of colonisation and its legacy of racism 
to others from cross-border issues of migrancy and xenophobia. We seek opportunities in the 
latter – which requires variation from Levinas and the language of alterity in literary studies. 
2 After explaining the etymology of xenophobia as fear of the ‘stranger’, Mohr quotes Banton 
to treat xenophobia as fear of the Other (2008: x). That compilation, titled Embracing the 
Other, Addressing Xenophobia in the New Literatures in English collates 23 essays that 
consider xenophobia in literature in relation to ‘the other’ (or ‘the Other’) over five 
continents. Two address South African literature (Petzold on Conyngham, and Marín upon 
Gordimer’s later novels). 
3 For example, Petzold explains Conyngham's work was typical of an 'apocalyptic' theme of 
white South African writers in the mid-1980s. In Conyngham's The Arrowing of the Cane 
(1986), The Lostness of Alice (1998) and The Desecration of the Graves (1990) a ‘pattern of 
apocalyptic visions becomes apparent’. To do so, a ‘specific threat from “outside” is utilised 
to create an atmosphere of violence and utter hopelessness. It is this form of a “negative 
embrace” of the Other that strengthens white fears of black South Africans and reinforces 
xenophobic tendencies’ (2008: 142). Note our distinction between racism and xenophobia. 
4 In the collection Mobilizing Hospitality, Derrida’s ‘hospitality’ – equated also to Levinas – 
is taken as basic to treatment of asylum (cf. the editor’s ‘Introduction: Mobilising and 
Mooring Hospitality’ (Gibson 2007:9). In addition to a bibliography of over 100 works, that 
introduction lists applications of Derrida’s hospitality across nine authors and five countries.  
5 Rosello, in Postcolonial Hospitality, The Immigrant as Guest, explains that ‘[o]ne of the 
books that most lucidly addresses the potential ambivalence of hospitality is Jacques 
Derrida's Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Written in homage to the dead philosopher, Adieu is a 
reading of Levinas's Totalité et Infini, which Derrida calls an ‘immense treatise of 
hospitality’’ (2001, 11; quoting Derrida 1999, 21).  
6 As to ‘fiction’, for a recent equation of ‘radical alterity’ to ‘hospitality’ in English Studies in 
Africa, as basal to post-transitional and contemporary South African literature v. Moonsamy 
(2014). In cultural studies, v. the  ‘Introduction: Facing the Other at the Gates of Democracy’ 
in the important Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia and the Reinvention of 
Difference in South Africa (2008: 1-25). We aim to support such study as we proceed. 
7 All inline references are to Totalité et infini (1961) as the English translation Totality and 
Infinity (1969) employs only two terms (the other, the Other). 
8 In this paper, we employ ‘we’ to refer to ourselves (the author), and also those who live in a 
collective – the xenophobic, Levinas’, Derrida’s – to avoid overt difference between those 
who lack and those who do not. ‘I’ signifies Levinas’ or Derrida’s essential ego. 
9 We are aware of the complexities of such examples, for instance, some deem these attacks 
were not ‘xenophobic’ but instances of an internalised afrophobia. We demarcate xenophobia 
insofar as it parallels Levinas and fragments of Derrida developed from Levinas. 
10 We will not yet address ‘the third’, which emerges in Levinas’ work by Autrement qu’être. 
Derrida is aware that it adds complexity, as the third – which must not, he emphasizes, be 
treated as ‘the third man’ (29), as though Levinas restores anthropology – is required to 
mediate the ‘relation’ to the ‘other’ to arrive at justice, a condition for politics. 
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11 Cf. also Gibson 169, Flockemann 266 n. 4, Still 2010.  
12 V. Derrida (1984, 1984b), which avoid mention of hospitality or xenophobia.  
13 Derrida’s Aporias (18-19, 20). Derrida details the ‘double concept of the border’, even 
between ‘Europe and non-Europe’ as central to a plural ‘logic of the aporia’ that guides his 
oeuvre. He mentions xenophobia outright once as that bound to the law which dictates a 
‘duty’ to ‘welcome foreigners in order to not only integrate them but to recognise and accept 
their alterity’ (19). He then develops that plural logic to consider the immigrant or emigrant 
and hospitality (33) – Derrida’s plural logic sets aside xenophobia to favour a duty, leading to 
hospitality. Duty develops from Kant’s categorical imperative, but even so, Derrida’s logic is 
unconcerned with the intentionality of the fearful xenophobic (and even the fear of the 
migrant, as we note below). Hence, thereafter, Derrida occluded mention of xenophobia to 
focus upon hospitality, cf. 1997b, which considers border checks, 2001, which considers the 
migrant issue, and 2002, which also considers the ‘absolute stranger’ as ‘uninvited guest’ in 
relation to the host and hospitality (361-362), via Levinas since Totalité et infini (364 ff.).  
14 On 9 January 2015, The New Age reported that refugees in Johannesburg had ‘refused to 
move to a new shelter’, due to ‘fear of xenophobic attacks’, as some ‘community members 
had threatened to attack them’. Those foreigners refuse a home in the first place, due to fear 
and threat – words employed in a very everyday fashion. Authorities did not notice; the 
attacks began a week afterward. 
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